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Abstract
How does partisan regulation of political markets aﬀect elections? We investigate
how the partisan control of ballot format, which is expressly regulated – often to the
apparent advantage of incumbents and major parties – in all U.S. states, aﬀects vot-
ing. Through the analysis of a unique natural experiment, we focus speciﬁcally on the
longstanding question of whether the name order of candidates on ballots aﬀects elec-
tion outcomes. Since 1975, California law has mandated randomizing the ballot order
with a lottery. Previous studies, relying overwhelmingly on observational data, have
yielded largely conﬂicting results. Using improved statistical methods, our analysis of
statewide elections from 1978 to 2002 reveals that ballot order might have changed the
winner in twelve percent of all primary races, including major and minor party races.
We propose that all electoral jurisdictions should randomize ballot order to minimize
ballot eﬀects, and show that randomization may be substantially more cost-eﬀective at
reducing voting bias than currently proposed voting technology reforms.
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For decades, scholars have attempted to assess the eﬀects of ballot forms on elections, an eﬀort
that has intensiﬁed since the election debacles of Bush v. Gore. Ballot reform bears signiﬁcant
policy implications, with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 authorizing almost 4 billion dollars
to reform eﬀorts. One particular research agenda, spanning ﬁve decades and dozens of books and
articles, examines the causal eﬀect of name order on ballots. Scholars worry that particular rules of
election administration may have major unintended, or possibly intended, consequences on election
outcomes. Although some have claimed that candidates listed earlier on the ballot gain more votes
solely because of ballot position, previous studies have yielded conﬂicting results about whether
ballot order eﬀects even exist.
The source of the disagreement may well be methodological. While scholars who assert large
ballot order eﬀects rely on observational data, where name order is not randomized and possibly
confounded, studies ﬁnding no eﬀect have often used laboratory experiments that may lack exter-
nal validity. To overcome these diﬃculties, we analyze a unique randomized natural experiment
conducted in California statewide elections from 1978 to 2002. Since 1975, California elections law
has mandated that the ballot order for statewide oﬃces be physically randomized – after being
“shaken vigorously,” alphabet letters would be drawn from a lottery container to determine the
order of candidates (Cal. Elec. Code § 13112(c) (2003)). The California alphabet lottery therefore
oﬀers a series of ideal natural experiments that allow us to test ballot order eﬀects for varying types
of candidates and oﬃces in actual elections.
Examining a total of 473 candidates in 80 races from 13 general elections and 8 primary elections,
we ﬁnd that in general elections, ballot order substantially impacts minor party candidates, while
having inconclusive eﬀects on major party candidates. In primaries, on the other hand, being listed
ﬁrst signiﬁcantly increases the vote share for any candidate: major party candidates generally gain
two percentage points of the total party vote, while minor party candidates may increase their vote
shares by ﬁfty percent of their baseline vote. In fact, primary eﬀects are so substantial that ballot
order might have changed the winner in as many as twelve percent of all primary races examined. In
general elections, we ﬁnd the largest eﬀect for nonpartisan races where candidates in ﬁrst position
gain two percentage points on average. In contrast, we observe little diﬀerence in estimated causal
eﬀects of ballot order between types of oﬃces for general elections, although eﬀects appear to be
somewhat larger for major oﬃces in primaries. Our results are largely consistent with a theory
of partisan cuing, where party labels convey information to uninformed voters (e.g., Schaﬀner and
1Streb, 2002; Snyder and Ting, 2002). When party labels are not available, as in nonpartisan races,
or not informative, as in party primaries, voter decisions are most likely to be inﬂuenced by the
ballot order.
Our research also pertains to several other important scholarly literatures, in particular in light
of the fact that in the vast majority of U.S. states legislatures have mandated that major party
candidates or incumbents be listed ﬁrst. First, election law scholars have noted the perverse ef-
fects of partisan regulation of electoral administration and resulting role for judicial review (e.g.,
Issacharoﬀ, Pildes and Karlan, 2001; Issacharoﬀ and Pildes, 1998; Hasen, 1997). Our case study
demonstrates so-called “partisan lockups,” the drafting of election rules that are anti-competitive
in nature, in the context of the most basic building block of democracies: election ballots. Second,
behavioral research has also begun to recognize the ability of decisionmakers to capitalize on cog-
nitive biases (e.g., Rabin, 1998; Levitt, 2004; Druckman, 2001). Our ﬁndings suggest that ballot
format laws that do not randomize are far from innocuous. As has been recognized in several other
markets, incumbents and major parties appear to have stacked electoral rules of the political mar-
ket, in what might appear to be nominally fair terms, to exploit voter cognitive biases to entrench
themselves in oﬃce. In addition to this positive analysis, our work adds a detailed case study from
a prescriptive perspective as to how law can help to produce unbiased results in social choice by
eliminating the impact of cognitive biases of individual actors via what we show to be cost-eﬀective
randomization (Garrett, 1999; Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, 1998; Sunstein, 2000).
A third literature to which our research pertains is the work in statistics and econometrics
on the identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects, which remains the key inferential problem that pervades
the ballot regulation literature (Heckman et al., 1998; Rosenbaum, 2002; Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983). Randomized natural experiments such as the California alphabet lottery provide an excep-
tional opportunity for social scientists to draw credible causal inferences (Angrist, 1990; Angrist
and Krueger, 1991; Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote, 2001; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000). The main
beneﬁts of natural experiments are threefold. First, natural experiments permit the testing of
causal eﬀects with more credible and testable assumptions than conventional observational studies
(Ho et al., 2004; Imai and van Dyk, 2004). Second, natural experiments take place in real settings,
thereby maximizing external validity compared to laboratory experiments. Third, natural experi-
ments are not constrained by practical, ﬁnancial, and ethical constraints as are ﬁeld experiments.
Capitalizing on the unique California experiment, we demonstrate widely applicable statistical
techniques to formally test treatment randomization and to identify treatment eﬀects.
2The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background on ballot order
eﬀects and the morass of extant ﬁndings. Section 3 describes the California alphabet lottery and
examines the crucial identiﬁcation assumption that the resulting alphabets are indeed randomized.
In Section 4, we discuss methodological issues of estimating ballot order eﬀects and present the
results of our analysis. Section 5 spells out the policy implication for election law, namely that
election oﬃcials in all states should randomize the ballot order to minimize ballot eﬀects. The
Section also provides evidence that randomization may be substantially more cost-eﬀective at
reducing voting bias than currently proposed electoral reforms. Section 6 concludes.
2 Elections and Ballot Order
Social scientists have rediscovered the importance of ballots since the days of counting chads in
Florida (Niemi and Herrnson, 2003). Recent studies have ranged from examining the causal eﬀects
of the butterﬂy ballot (Brady et al., 2001; Wand et al., 2001), forms of voting equipment (Tomz
and Van Houweling, 2003), partisan labels (Ansolabehere et al., 2003), and the ballot order of
candidates (Kimball and Kropf, 2003; Krosnick, Miller and Tichy, 2003; Koppell and Steen, 2004).
Current interest in ballot order is rooted in a half century of research investigating the causal eﬀect
of the order in which candidates appear on ballots (e.g., Bain and Hecock, 1957; Darcy, 1986;
Darcy and McAllister, 1990; Gold, 1952; Miller and Krosnick, 1998; Scott, 1972). This research
has spanned even beyond the United States, with studies in Australia (MacKerras, 1970), Britain
(Bagley, 1966), Spain (Lijphart and Pintor, 1988), and Ireland (Robson and Walsh, 1973).
Beyond the academic literature, practical implications abound. Dozens of U.S. court decisions
(e.g., Bradley v. Perrodin, 106 Cal. App. 4th 1153 (2003), Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661 (1975);
Mann v. Powell, 333 F. Supp. 1261 (1969)) and the drafting of electoral statutes in all ﬁfty states
(e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3505.03 (Anderson 2003); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-10-8.1 (2003)) rely
on a version of the claim that vote shares will accrue to a candidate solely for being listed ﬁrst
on the ballot. And, electoral jurisdictions, from town to city, and from province to country, have
proposed “remedying” ballot order eﬀects by instituting some form of rotation or randomization.1
At heart in these reform eﬀorts lies the empirical claim of ballot order eﬀects.
1For example, see Michael White, D’Hondted House of British PR, Guardian, at 23, Sep. 24, 1998 (proposing
randomization in Britain); CA Assembly Bill AB 718 (Feb. 19, 2003) (mandating randomized alphabets for California
cities); Bill Would Use Lottery to Place Candidate Names on Ballot, Union Leader, April 16, 1999, at A13 (proposing
randomization for New Hampshire legislature).
3Scholars have also developed theoretical propositions about ballot order eﬀects. Most broadly,
psychological theory oﬀers a hypothesis of “primacy eﬀects,” whereby the cognitive costs to pro-
cessing alternatives bias individuals toward earlier choices (Miller and Krosnick, 1998, pp.293–295).
Stemming from this theory, information salience, such as party labels, the prominence of the oﬃce
or candidates, and media coverage, is hypothesized to aﬀect the magnitude of ballot order eﬀects.
In a similar, though not necessarily consistent, vein, scholars have also proposed that candidates
listed last should beneﬁt from a “recency eﬀect” (Bain and Hecock, 1957), or that candidates to-
ward the middle of the ballot should be advantaged (Bagley, 1966). Ballot order eﬀects may also
emerge due to the fact that in most states, ballot order is actually informative, as major party
candidates are generally listed earlier on the ballot by law.
Yet previous empirical studies disagree sharply over the existence of ballot order eﬀects. Ad-
herents claim that ballot order systematically aﬀects the outcomes of many electoral contests,
“[m]ost strikingly...in the highly-publicized and hotly contested presidential race [of 2000]” (Kros-
nick, Miller and Tichy, 2003, p.52). Detractors assert that “there is no evidence that there is a
ballot position advantage in general elections” (Darcy, 1986, p.649).
The reason for this lack of consensus in the existing literature may well be methodological. The
bulk of previous studies has relied on observational data, in which the name order is not physically
randomized. Such analyses necessarily rest on assumptions that are diﬃcult to verify, and their
validity may be questioned if any confounding eﬀects, and thereby omitted variable bias, exist.
As outlined in Section 5, the majority of U.S. states arrange the order of candidates on ballots
by some partisan or alphabetical rule, making the identiﬁcation of ballot order eﬀects diﬃcult. In
addition, Darcy and McAllister (1990, pp.8–10) ﬁnds numerous cases of abuse by elections oﬃcials
and candidates, who, believing ballot order eﬀects to exist, manipulate the placement of candidates
to maximize expected vote share.
Even worse, some studies may not have any evidence on the quantity of interest asserted. In
1975, the California Supreme Court ruled to prohibit listing incumbents ﬁrst. This decision was
largely based on a study that analyzes only non-incumbent elections for the reason that these were
the only ones for which ballot order was rotated (Scott, 1972). Inferences from that study may
thereby result in severe extrapolation beyond the bounds of the data if non-incumbent elections
systematically diﬀer from elections with incumbents (King and Zeng, 2003). The best observational
research to date examines elections in which candidate names were rotated. Even those studies,
however, assume complete randomization without testing it.
4Studies that actually analyze some form of randomized data have found little evidence for
ballot order eﬀects (Darcy, 1986; Gold, 1952). Miller and Krosnick (1998, p.297) conclude, after
reviewing over 30 articles and books on the subject, that the only studies without design ﬂaws (with
randomization) detect no ballot order eﬀects.2 Yet inferences from such randomized experiments
might be limited to unrepresentative samples, such as university students and county fairs (Darcy,
1986), elections for the anthropological association (Gold, 1952), and unrealistic lab settings, such
as an election with candidates for whom no other information but the name is known (Bagley,
1966). In response to these problems, Darcy and McAllister (1990, p.5) concludes that “much of
the literature is methodologically ﬂawed,” while one expert opined that “there is virtually nothing
at all [that has] been done on the subject much less anything shown” (Miller and Krosnick, 1998,
p.318).
To our knowledge, the only study that analyzes randomized name order in real elections is
Krosnick, Miller and Tichy (2003) (“KMT”). We extend and improve that study in two principal
ways. First, KMT only examines two randomized races from California and one randomized race
from North Dakota for the US President and Senate races for the general election in 2000. In
contrast, we analyze 80 races in 13 general and 8 primary elections, spanning 10 oﬃces from 1978
to 2002.3 As a result, we are able to analyze diﬀerent types of oﬃces, candidates, and elections
to address key substantive propositions in the literature. Our dataset also allows us to treat races
as repeated natural experiments, yielding inferences with greater precision. This is an important
advantage given that the analysis of each election consists only the sample size of 80 assembly
districts. Second, we improve the methodology used in KMT’s analysis. In particular, we do
not impose strict functional form and parametric assumptions to identify the treatment eﬀect.4
Finally, our conclusions contradict a main claim of KMT that ballot order signiﬁcantly aﬀects
major candidates in general elections, most notably in the presidential election of 2000.
3 The California Alphabet Lottery
In this section, we ﬁrst describe the procedure of the California alphabet lottery as mandated
by state election law. Second, we conduct statistical tests to show that the alphabets used for
2One exception to this general experimental ﬁnding is Forsythe et al. (1993).
3The bulk of the analysis in KMT relies on observational data from Ohio elections, for which randomization is
more diﬃcult to verify.
4KMT used linear regression in its analysis.
5the elections in the past twenty years are indeed randomly ordered, a crucial assumption of our
subsequent analysis.
3.1 Lottery Procedure
California election ballots are printed in column-vertical format, depicting the name, party, and
occupation of all candidates. Until 1975, California elections law mandated that incumbents appear
ﬁrst on the ballot in the majority of statewide elections (Scott, 1972, p.365). In 1975, however,
the California Supreme Court struck down the provision that reserved the ﬁrst ballot position to
incumbents, and held as unconstitutional, on equal protection grounds, ballot forms that present
candidate names in alphabetical order (Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661 (1975)). The decision relied
prominently on studies and testimonies by Bain and Hecock (1957) and Scott (1972). Scott (1972,
p.376) investigated the eﬀect of ballot order using ballot rotations in ten non-incumbent California
races. While providing only point estimates of the ballot order eﬀect, the study concluded that
“one can attribute at least a ﬁve percent increase in the ﬁrst listed candidate’s vote total to a
positional bias,” a ﬁgure that has often been quoted by the Secretary of State since.5
In response to that decision, the California legislature passed an alphabet randomization pro-
cedure to determine the ballot order of candidates.6 The randomization applies to the national
oﬃces of the U.S. Presidency and U.S. Senators, as well as the statewide oﬃces of the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Controller, Treasurer, Attorney General, Insurance Com-
missioner, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The law spells out in precise detail the
procedure for drawing a “randomized alphabet”:
Each letter of the alphabet shall be written on a separate slip of paper, each of which
shall be folded and inserted into a capsule. Each capsule shall be opaque and of uniform
weight, color, size, shape, and texture. The capsules shall be placed in a container,
which shall be shaken vigorously in order to mix the capsules thoroughly. The container
then shall be opened and the capsules removed at random one at a time. As each is
removed, it shall be opened and the letter on the slip of paper read aloud and written
down. The resulting random order of letters constitutes the randomized alphabet, which
is to be used in the same manner as the conventional alphabet in determining the order
of all candidates in all elections. For example, if two candidates with the surnames
Campbell and Carlson are running for the same oﬃce, their order on the ballot will
depend on the order in which the letters M and R were drawn in the randomized
alphabet drawing (Cal. Elec. Code § 13112(a) (2003)).
5Bain and Hecock (1957, p.85) similarly found that “[t]he ﬁrst position in a vertical list was universally the
preferred when paper ballots were used” in several Michigan cities.
6The provision was added under Assembly Bill 1961, 1975–76 Regular Session of the California Assembly, as Stats
1975, ch. 1211, Sections 16 & 17.
6The container used in the drawing is in the same style as that used in one of oﬃcial state
lotteries. The code further mandates that the drawing be open to public inspection and advance
notice made to the media, the representative of local election oﬃcials, and party chairmen (Cal.
Elec. Code § 13112(c) (2003)). These explicit procedures deﬁned in the law are designed to ensure
accurate implementation of randomization. California election oﬃcials appear to have taken this
duty seriously. The Secretary of State, in charge of the randomization procedure, maintains two
designated “random alpha persons” who draw the letters from a lottery bin. When queried about
the process, oﬃcials insist that “it’s the law” to randomize.7
Equally important to our estimation strategy, California elections law mandates that the ran-
domized ballot order is rotated through the 80 assembly districts for all statewide candidates,
the Secretary of State shall arrange the names of the candidates for the oﬃce in accor-
dance with the randomized alphabet ...for the First Assembly District. Thereafter, for
each succeeding Assembly district, the name appearing ﬁrst in the last preceding As-
sembly district shall be placed last, the order of the other names remaining unchanged
(Cal. Elec. Code 13111(c) (2003)).
The rotation itself is not implemented randomly, which we take into account in our statistical
analysis. The procedure nonetheless provides substantial variation of the ballot order, enabling the
estimation of candidate-speciﬁc ballot order eﬀects.
Figure 1 depicts the 80 Assembly Districts that have been in eﬀect from 1992 until 2002. Note
that the ordering of Assembly Districts is not random, a property that we explicitly address in our
analysis. To the contrary, the California Constitution mandates, inter alia, that (a) districts be
numbered from north to south, (b) the population be “reasonably equal” across districts, (c) all
districts be contiguous, and (d) geographical subregions be respected to the extent possible (Cal.
Const., art XXI, § 1). Every ten years following the national census, the districts are adjusted
accordingly in state legislative reapportionment. For the time period of our interest, redistricting
occurred in 1982, 1992, and 2002.
The randomized rotation procedure has remained virtually unchanged since 1975. A review of
the legislative history reveals that original Assembly Bill 1961 passed in 1975 has remained identical
with respect to the randomization procedure.8 This stability of the election process allows us to
examine the causal eﬀects of ballot order for a host of elections from the past twenty ﬁve years.
One concern about the California alphabet lottery is that the randomized alphabet may induce
7Telephone interview with Melissa Warren, Elections oﬃcer at Oﬃce of Secretary of State, Aug. 15, 2003.
8Assembly Bill 1961, 1975 – 76 Regular Session of the California Assembly, as Stats 1975, ch. 1211, Sec-
tions 16 and 17.
7Los Angeles Metropolitan Region
59 59
41 41 54 54
44 44
64 64
54 54
61 61
62 62
53 53 72 72
60 60
57 57
35 35
42 42
43 43
58 58
55 55
39 39
56 56
68 68
40 40
49 49
52 52
50 50 47 47
51 51
69 69
45 45
48 48
46 46
Bay Area
8 8
7 7
6 6
10 10
15 15
17 17
21 21
20 20
11 11
19 19
18 18
24 24
9 9
14 14
12 12 16 16 13 13 12 12
22 22 23 23
2 2
34 34
3 3
1 1
4 4
80 80
30 30
25 25
32 32
65 65
28 28
33 33
29 29
35 35
26 26
8 8
66 66
75 75
27 27
7 7
6 6
36 36
31 31
10 10
35 35
15 15 17 17
21 21
38 38
63 63 37 37
73 73
59 59
71 71
41 41
5 5
54 54
20 20
11 11
44 44
54 54
78 78
74 74
19 19
64 64
70 70
24 24
54 54
61 61 62 62
37 37
76 76
9 9
67 67 53 53
77 77
14 14
12 12 13 13
79 79
37 37
35 35
Proportion of Registered 
Voters Democratic
Legend
0.29 - 0.40
0.41 - 0.44
0.45 - 0.48
0.49 - 0.55
0.56 - 0.62
0.63 - 0.88
Figure 1: 1992 California Assembly Districts. The districts with darker color are those with a
higher proportion of Democrats among registered voters.
Source: The California Spatial Information Library. Map created using Arcmap.
behavioral changes of candidates, making it diﬃcult to isolate the direct eﬀects of ballot order on
voters. For example, candidates listed last on the ballot in a particular assembly district might
campaign more intensely in that district, in fear of some ballot order eﬀect. Or, candidates might
be chosen to assure a higher ballot order in favorable districts (Masterman, 1964). However, such
a scenario seems unlikely given that the randomized alphabet is drawn very late in the game.
All but write-in candidates must have declared candidacy and been certiﬁed by the time that
the drawing of a randomized alphabet takes place, and even sample (non-randomized) ballots are
printed before the drawing. Only minor adjustments, such as removal of a candidate from the
ballot in the case of a death, occur after the drawing.9
9Even if there are candidate behavioral changes resulting from the drawing, this “intention-to-treat” eﬀect may
still be of important policy signiﬁcance.
8Year Election Randomized Alphabet
1982 Primary S C X D Q G W R V Y U A N H L P B K J I E T O M F Z
General L S N D X A M W V T O F I B K Y U P E Q C J Z H R G
1983 Consolidated L C P K I A U G Z O N B X D W H E M F V R S T Y Q J
1984 Primary W M F B Q Y T D J U O V I K R H S N P C A E L Z G X
General V W I H R Q G J O M T S Y C A F U X K B P E Z N D L
1986 General Q N H U B J E G M V L W X C K O F D Z R Y I T S P A
1988 Primary W O K N Q A V T H J F Z L B U D Y M I R G C E S X P
General S W F M K J U Y A T V G O N Q B D E P L Z C I X R H
1990 Primary E J B Y Q F K M O V X L N Z C W A P R D G T H I S U
General W F C L D I N J H V K O S A R E Q B T M Y U G Z X P
1992 Primary U R F A J C D N M K P Z Y X G W O H E B I S V L Q T
General F Y U A J S B Z G O E Q R L I M H V N T P D K X C W
1994 Primary K J H G A M I Q U N C Z S W V R P Y B L O T D F E X
General V I A E M S O K L B G N W Y D P U F Z Q J X C R H T
1996 Primary G E F C Y P D B Z I V A U S M L H K N T O J Q R X W
General J Y E P A U S Q B H T R K N L X F D O G M W I Z C V
1998 Primary L W U J X K C N D O Q A P T Z R Y F E V B H G I M S
General W K D N V A G P Y C Z I S T L J X Q O F H R B U M E
2000 Primary O P C Y I H X Z V R S Q E K L G D W J U T M B F A N
General I T F G J S W R N M K U Y L D C Q A H X O E B V P Z
2002 Primary W I Z C O M A Q U K X E B Y N P T R L V S J H D F G
General H M V P E B Q U G N D K X Z J A W Y C O S F I T R L
2003 Recall R W Q O J M V A H B S G Z X N T C I E K U P D Y F L
Table 1: Randomized Alphabets Used for the California Statewide Elections Since 1982.
3.2 Are Alphabets Really Random?
Election oﬃcials seem to have taken seriously their legal obligation of conducting the alphabet lot-
tery. Given the evidence of manipulation of ballot order in other states (e.g., Darcy and McAllister,
1990), however, we conduct statistical tests to ensure empirically the accurate implementation of
the randomization. Such tests often help discover unexpected implementation errors of random-
ization (Imai, 2004). As shown in Table 1, we collected the randomized alphabets used for 23
California statewide elections since 1982. We use this list to test whether the randomization proce-
dure described above has in practice produced completely randomized alphabets not favoring any
particular letters, and hence particular candidates.
We conduct a rank test under the null hypothesis that the alphabet is completely randomized.
In particular, we compare the relative positions of all possible pairs of letters by calculating the
9mean absolute rank diﬀerences of paired letters across elections,
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where R(Lik) denotes a rank or position of the ith letter of the alphabet on the randomized list of
the kth election. This statistic averages the relative positions of two distinct letters over 23 elections
and all possible such pairs. The resulting sample statistic for the 23 observed alphabets in Table 1
is 2.07, representing the average absolute diﬀerence in the relative positions of all possible pairs
of distinct letters. Under the null hypothesis of complete randomization, the distribution of this
statistic can be calculated exactly by considering all possible lists of alphabet which are equally
likely. However, since there are 26! such lists for each election, we approximate this statistic by
simulation. We draw 10,000 lists of 23 randomized alphabets with equal probability, and then
calculate the statistic for each list. Finally, we compute the one-tailed p-value by comparing the
observed value of the statistic with its simulated values. The resulting one-tailed p-value is 0.15,
indicating that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of complete randomization. We also conducted
similar randomization tests based on the rank diﬀerences between even and odd letters, and letters
in the top and bottom half of the true alphabet. Similarly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
complete randomization with one-tailed p-values of 0.27 and 0.30, respectively. In sum, there is no
evidence that election oﬃcials in California have incorrectly randomized the ballot order.
4 Causal Eﬀects of Ballot Order
With the aid of the California State Archives and the Statewide Data Base at the University
of California, Berkeley, we coded election returns data by assembly districts for a total of 80
statewide races (44 primary races and 36 general races), going back to 1978. Table 2 lists all the
races examined in this paper. These include 13 general elections and 8 primaries for 10 statewide
oﬃces, yielding a total of 473 candidates analyzed. We also collected the candidate names from
which we reconstructed the ballot order for each of these races in each district using the oﬃcial
randomized alphabets.10
In what follows, we describe our analysis of the California alphabet lottery and present estimated
ballot order eﬀects, and such eﬀects conditional on parties, oﬃces, and elections. We ﬁrst place our
analysis in the formal statistical framework of causal inference. Second, we describe our estimation
10When the oﬃcial randomized alphabet was not available, we gathered available Assembly District ballots to
recover the ballot order.
10Election President
Senate
Governor
Lt.
Gov.
Atty Genl
Controller
Ins.
Comm.
Sec.
State
Treasurer
Supt Educ
1978 General − 5
1980 General 7 5 − − − − − − − −
1982 General − 5 5
Primary − 19 20
1984 General 5 − − − − − − − − −
1986 General − 5 5
Primary − 20 9
1988 General 5 5 − − − − − − − −
Primary 6 − − − − − − − −
1990 General − − 5
Primary − − 19
1992 General 6 5,5a − − − − − − − −
1994 General − 6 5
Primary − 12
1996 General 8 − − − − − − − − −
1998 General − 7 7 7 5 7 6 7 6 2
Primary − 13 17 13 10 7 8 8 9 5
2000 General 7 7 − − − − − − − −
Primary 23 15 − − − − − − − −
2002 General − − 6 7 5 5 6 7 6 2
Primary − − 11 8 6 10 11 13 7 4
Table 2: Number of Candidates Running in All Races Examined. “−” indicates that no
election was held for that oﬃce in a particular year. Blank cells represent races where
election returns data were not available by assembly districts. The number of candidates
in this table diﬀers slightly from total number of candidates analyzed because of several
uncontested party primaries.
aThere were two senatorial elections in 1992 both of which had ﬁve candidates running.
11strategies and interpret the identiﬁcation assumptions. Finally, we present our estimates and
compare them to the margins of victory observed in the races in order to compute the potential
substantive impact on election outcomes if the candidate names were ordered diﬀerently.
4.1 Causal Inference and Treatment Assignment
We estimate candidate-speciﬁc ballot order eﬀects.11 For each candidate, we observe the random-
ized (and rotated) ballot order in each of k = 1,...,K = 80 districts. That is, we observe the ballot
order, the value of the multi-valued treatment variable, Tk = t, for all k where t ∈ T = {1,...,J}
and J is the total number of candidates in that race. Finally, we also observe candidate’s vote
share for every district with the corresponding ballot position, denoted by Yk(t) for t = Tk.
Our analysis is based on the formal statistical framework for causal inference, frequently referred
to as the Rubin causal model (Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986). In this framework, Y = {Yk(t); t ∈ T }
is regarded as a set of potential outcomes, T is a set of possible treatment values, and Yk(t) is a
random variable that maps a particular treatment, t, to a potential outcome. The fundamental
problem of causal inference is that only one realization of potential outcomes for each unit is
observed. This means that we do not observe the counterfactual vote shares in a district if the
candidates’ names on the ballot were ordered diﬀerently. Causal inference hence requires estimating
these missing potential outcomes.
In the majority of experimental studies, researchers assign treatment to units that are ran-
domly selected with equal probability. We call this common procedure “simple random treatment
assignment” with the following deﬁnition,
Definition 1 (Simple Random Treatment Assignment) From a list of K units, assign a
treatment to n units that are randomly selected with an equal probability (without replacement).
In the California alphabet lottery, the randomization procedure is somewhat diﬀerent since ran-
domization is conducted only for the ﬁrst Assembly District and the treatment assignments for the
other districts are systematically determined thereafter. That is, the randomized ballot order in
the ﬁrst district will be rotated such that in the next district, the candidate in the jth position
(j ≥ 2) will be in (j − 1)th position and the candidate in the ﬁrst position will be placed in the
last position, and so on. We call this procedure “systematic random treatment assignment” and
11We do not pool candidates or races because doing so would introduce omitted variable bias due to candidate-
speciﬁc or race-speciﬁc eﬀects (such as the prominence of the race, and media exposure). Appendix B shows the
balance of district-level covariates, which ensures the validity of our candidate-speciﬁc analysis.
12formally deﬁne it as follows,
Definition 2 (Systematic Random Treatment Assignment) From a list of K units, assign
a treatment to the rth unit, and every Jth unit thereafter. For simplicity, assume that K = nJ,
where n is the desired size of a treatment group, J is a positive integer no less than 2, and r is an
integer variable randomly drawn with an equal probability from {r : 1 ≤ r ≤ J}.
The names, systematic and simple, come from the fact that these two randomization schemes
resemble simple random sampling and systematic sampling in the survey sampling literature (e.g.,
Cochran, 1977, ch.8). This connection enables us to apply the results of this literature to our
analysis of the California alphabet lottery. To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to explicitly
draw this connection and to employ results from systematic sampling in the context of causal
inference.
4.2 Identifying Causal Eﬀects of Ballot Order with Fewer and More Credible
Assumptions
To estimate ballot order eﬀects for each candidate, we require two additional assumptions that
are typically implicit in conventional estimators. The Rubin causal model enables researchers to
interpret these assumptions substantively, and to relax more restrictive assumptions of conventional
estimators.
Assumption 1 (No Interference among Units, Rubin (1980)) Yk(t) ⊥ ⊥ Tk0 for all t ∈ T
and k0 6= k,
where ⊥ ⊥ denotes independence. This assumption is also referred to as stable unit treatment value,
and implies that the potential outcome for one unit does not depend on the treatment assignment
of another unit (Cox, 1958).12 In the case of the California alphabet lottery, this assumption is
reasonable when considering candidate-speciﬁc eﬀects.13 However, the assumption is violated in
an analysis that pools candidates, typical in this literature: since candidate vote shares in one
district must sum to 1, a ballot order eﬀect on one candidate necessarily aﬀects the remaining
candidates.14 Hence, we estimate eﬀects separately for each candidate, which relaxes pooling
12In addition, the stable unit treatment value assumption asserts that there are no diﬀering version of the treatment.
This means that changes in ballot order are the same across Assembly Districts, and could be violated if ballots diﬀered
dramatically across districts.
13For a purely nonparametric approach in the context of the California Recall, see Ho and Imai (2004).
14One potential solution to this interference would be to explicitly model all candidates’ vote shares at the same time
as a function of their ballot positions by, for example, a multinomial logit model. There are substantial disadvantages
13assumptions in extant studies that are known to be violated and permits us to estimate diﬀerential
eﬀects for diﬀerent party candidates.
The second assumption is essential for unbiased estimation of treatment eﬀects and is satisﬁed
by simple random assignment of Deﬁnition 1.
Assumption 2 (Random Assignment) Yk(t) ⊥ ⊥ I(Tk = t) for all k and t ∈ T ,
where I(·) represents an indicator function. It is straightforward to show that systematic random
assignment of the California alphabet lottery (Deﬁnition 2) also satisﬁes this assumption since the
ballot order is independent of potential outcomes. In Appendix B, we further empirically test this
assumption by examining the balance of observable covariates from Census and registration data.
There is no evidence that the assumption is violated, which means that accounting for covariates
will not aﬀect point estimates, and if anything will only lead to more precise estimates. Moreover,
covariates that are typically included in the literature are race and candidate speciﬁc covariates,
which we automatically control for by virtue of estimating candidate-speciﬁc eﬀects.
Assumptions 1 and 2 suﬃce to identify the average ballot order eﬀect for each candidate from
the observed data with uniformly fewer assumptions than commonly imposed in the literature.
Speciﬁcally, it is straightforward to show that the average treatment eﬀect for candidate j, τ ≡
Y (t0) − Y (t) where Y (s) ≡
PK
k=1 Yk(s)/K for s = t,t0 with t 6= t0, can be estimated without bias,
E(ˆ τ) = E
h
b Y (t0) − b Y (t)
i
= τ, (2)
where b Y (s) ≡
P
k∈{k:Tk=s} Yk(s)/ns and ns is the number of assembly districts where the candidate
is assigned to the sth ballot position.
Although an unbiased estimate of the average ballot eﬀect is readily available, the variance
calculation of this estimator is not straightforward. This is because systematic random assignment,
unlike simple random assignment, involves only one randomization. In Appendix A, we discuss
the details of our variance identiﬁcation strategy, which adapts an auxiliary variable strategy of
choosing the best variance estimators for a systematic sample (Wolter, 1984).15
to this approach, primarily due to additional assumptions and ineﬃciency. Nonetheless, we found that the results
are largely consistent with those presented here.
15(See Ho and Imai, 2004, for another alternative approach that is suitable for races with much larger number of
candidates)
144.3 Estimated Causal Eﬀects of Ballot Order
We report two primary quantities of interest: (a) the average absolute gain for each candidate due
to being in ﬁrst position, b Y (t = 1)− b Y (t 6= 1), and (b) the average relative gain for each candidate
due to being in ﬁrst position, [b Y (t = 1) − b Y (t 6= 1)]/b Y (t 6= 1). While we additionally investigated
eﬀects of all other positions, the primary robust eﬀect was that of being in ﬁrst position, which we
report here. We ﬁrst illustrate our analysis with the results for the 1998 and 2000 elections, and
then summarize the estimated ballot order eﬀects for all elections by considering each race as a
repeated experiment.
The top panel of Figure 2 presents estimates for the average relative percentage gain of all
candidates in the 1998 and 2000 general elections, with vertical bars indicating estimated 95%
conﬁdence intervals, using the minimum MSE variance estimator (see Appendix A). For 28 out
of the 68 candidates there are signiﬁcant eﬀects for which the conﬁdence intervals do not intersect
zero. The median gain was roughly 10% of the baseline vote share. On the other hand, almost all of
these estimates stem from minor party candidates, as seen by the fact that major party candidate
estimates for Democrats and Republicans, signiﬁed by the dark thin bars, are concentrated in the
bottom half of the ordering. Indeed, third party candidates have a median gain score of roughly
17%, whereas major party candidates had a relative gain of roughly 1%. In terms of absolute gains,
however, the estimates are relatively small for general elections, with a median gain of roughly 0.2%
of the total vote.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 presents the estimated average relative gains for the 1998 and 2000
primary elections.16 The magnitude of the eﬀects is substantially larger than in general elections.
For 74 of the 128 candidates, the conﬁdence intervals do not include zero, but more importantly the
ballot order aﬀects major and minor party candidates alike, with a median relative ballot eﬀect of
roughly 21%, and a striking range of gains across candidates. The median absolute gain is roughly
16The analysis of primary races is complicated slightly by the fact that California primary rules and reporting
changed substantially over the years. In 1998 California changed from a closed party primary to an open primary,
and reversed partially again in 2002 to a “modiﬁed closed” primary, under which registered voters could vote only on
their aﬃliated party’s ballot, but unaﬃliated voters could still request party ballots or receive nonpartisan ballots by
default. To accurately capture how winners are determined from primary races, and to facilitate comparisons across
elections, we calculate candidate vote shares as a proportion of the party vote in primaries when multiple candidates
are running, and vote share proportions of the total vote for uncontested (usually minor party) candidates. Lastly,
since party registration for closed primaries is largely uninformative, we conduct inferences with both the minimum
MSE variance estimator and the random estimator, with no substantive diﬀerence in results.
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Figure 2: Candidate-Speciﬁc Average Relative Gain due to Being Listed in First Position on Ballots
for 1998 and 2000 Elections. The top panel shows the results for general elections, and the bottom
panel displays those for primary elections. Circles indicate point estimates for each candidate, and
vertical bars represent estimated 95% conﬁdence intervals. In general elections, only minor party
and nonpartisan candidates are aﬀected by the ballot order. In primary elections, however, major
party candidates are also aﬀected.
16General Primary
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE
Democratic 0.05 0.46 0.25 0.90 1.89 0.32 43.58 5.53
Republican -0.06 0.53 -0.43 1.29 2.16 0.46 33.62 5.91
American Independent 0.16 0.02 20.83 1.39 2.33 0.15 26.76 3.55
Green 0.56 0.17 21.18 5.82 3.15 1.16 6.24 3.54
Libertarian 0.23 0.02 14.56 1.03 6.59 1.42 71.92 13.55
Natural Law 0.31 0.06 26.13 2.85 0.40 0.08 44.78 5.45
Peace and Freedom 0.28 0.03 25.49 2.15 6.31 0.53 14.75 1.43
Reform 0.26 0.07 19.57 2.23 4.11 1.56 48.45 9.66
Nonpartisan 1.95 0.30 9.21 3.31 3.44 0.78 19.42 4.05
Table 3: Party-Speciﬁc Average Causal Eﬀects of Being Listed in First Position on Ballots Using
All Races from 1978 to 2002. ATE and SE represent the average causal eﬀects and their standard
errors, respectively. For general and primary elections, the left two columns present the estimates of
average absolute gains in terms of the total or party vote, respectively, while the right two columns
show those of average relative gains. Each candidate-speciﬁc eﬀect is averaged over diﬀerent races
to obtain the overall average eﬀect for each party. In general elections, only minor party and
nonpartisan candidates are aﬀected by the ballot order. In primaries, however, the candidates of
all parties are aﬀected. The largest eﬀects are found for nonpartisan candidates.
1.6% of the party vote. Given that primary races have a much larger number of candidates, it is
notable that the absolute gain is larger than for general elections (see also Section 4.4).
Averaging over all the races from 1978 to 1992, Table 3 summarizes the estimated ballot eﬀects
for these 25 years.17 The rough patterns of the 1998 and 2000 elections hold across all elections
studied. In general elections, major party candidates exhibit no discernible ballot order eﬀect,
while the eﬀect on minor party candidates is substantial. Minor party candidates typically gain
from 15 to 30% of their baseline vote share in general elections. Given that minor party candidates
generally receive only a small proportion of the vote, however, this amounts to an average absolute
gain of roughly 0.2 to 0.6% of the total vote cast.
Testable propositions deriving from partisan cue theory would predict that cognitive biases
such as ballot eﬀects should be most prominent for nonpartisan races, independent candidates,
and primary races, since party labels are least informative in such races. These predictions bear
out consistently in our results. Independent and nonpartisan candidates gain 2.4% of the absolute
17In cases where multiple candidates from the same party or multiple nonpartisan candidates contested the election,
such as in primaries or nonpartisan elections, the simple average of those candidate-speciﬁc point estimates and
standard errors are used to obtain an estimate for each race, and these estimates are then averaged across elections
with the number of candidates in each race as weights.
17vote share when listed ﬁrst, and when the oﬃce itself is nonpartisan, candidates gain roughly
3.3% of the total vote share when in ﬁrst. This magnitude diﬀerence is consistent with the notion
that more information about candidate policy preferences is conveyed in races where at least some
candidates are partisans. On the other hand, since the only nonpartisan oﬃce in our dataset is
the Superintendent of Education, we cannot determine whether larger cognitive biases might stem
from lack of partisan labels, lower prominence of the oﬃce, or both.
In primaries, where the least information is conveyed by party aﬃliation, ballot order aﬀects all
candidates. Both Democratic and Republican candidates gain roughly one to two percent of the
party vote when in ﬁrst position, which constitutes a relative gain of roughly 30% to 40%. Since
the number of candidates is generally much larger in primaries, with, for example, ﬁve Republican
and six Democratic candidates running for the gubernatorial party nomination in 1998, this does
not mean that the eﬀect is conﬁned to minor candidates in the major parties. To the contrary,
many of major Democratic and Republican candidates are aﬀected by ballot order. From Michael
Huﬃngton in 1994 (ATE=4.5, SE=1.4), to Barbara Boxer in 1998 (ATE=2.7, SE=0.7), to Dianne
Feinstein in 2000 (ATE=1.5, SE=0.6), to Gary Mendoza in 2002 (ATE=2.7, SE=0.8), we observe
a robust eﬀect of ballot order on all types of candidates.
To provide another example, in the race for the Republican nomination for Lieutenant Governor
in 1998, the absolute eﬀect for Tim Leslie, who won the nomination by 10% of the vote, was
borderline signiﬁcant but substantial at 11% (SE=6.8), and the eﬀect on the runner-up, Richard
Mountjoy, was 9% (SE=2.2). In the Democratic Controller primary in 2002, both candidates for
Controller, Steve Westly and Johan Klehs, gained roughly 6% (SE=1.0) of the vote when listed
ﬁrst. In Section 4.4, we further analyze the potential eﬀects that non-randomized ballot order,
mandated in the majority of all states, could have on who wins a race.
Minor party candidates in primaries receive anywhere from 6 to 70% of their baseline vote share,
with Libertarian and Reform party candidates exhibiting the largest relative gains. Nonpartisan
candidates gain roughly two to six percent of the total vote when listed ﬁrst, which does not diﬀer
appreciably from nonpartisan gains in general elections or gains by other candidates in primaries.
Given that partisan labels are relatively uninformative in primaries, where there are often multiple
party candidates running, this result is not surprising in light of partisan cue theory.
Tables 4 and 5 present estimated average absolute and relative gains broken down by oﬃce and
party, respectively. In both general and primary elections, no discernible patterns emerge with
respect to the prominence of the oﬃce, or to the order in which the oﬃce appears on the ballot.
18General Elections
Party President
Senate
Governor
Lt.
Gov.
Atty Genl
Controller
Ins.
Comm.
Sec.
State
Treasurer
Supt Educ
Democrat 1.1 0.7 0.2 −1.1 −0.7 −1.9 0.2 −3.0 0.4
(1.0) (0.7) (1.0) (3.0) (1.4) (2.0) (1.5) (2.8) (1.7)
Republican −0.8 −0.6 1.5 2.2 −0.7 −5.0 1.5 2.6 −2.0
(1.2) (0.9) (1.1) (2.7) (1.6) (2.1) (2.3) (3.0) (2.3)
Amer. Indep. 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0)
Green 0.1 0.9 0.4 1.0 0.8 −0.5 0.2 1.3 0.5
(0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.7) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.8) (0.3)
Libertarian 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.2
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Natural Law 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.5
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.2) (0.3) (0.1) (0.3)
Peace & Frdm 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.0
(0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.1)
Reform 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
(0.3) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.0)
Nonpartisan 0.4 0.0 4.0
(0.4) (0.4) (0.5)
Primary Elections
Party President
Senate
Governor
Lt.
Gov.
Atty Genl
Controller
Ins.
Comm.
Sec.
State
Treasurer
Supt Educ
Democrat 1.6 1.5 0.6 5.6 4.6 3.3 3.6 2.4 7.1
(2.5) (0.5) (0.5) (2.8) (2.0) (1.0) (1.4) (1.1) (1.8)
Republican −0.9 2.8 0.6 5.5 4.8 2.1 3.2 2.8 3.1
(1.6) (1.0) (0.4) (2.7) (1.8) (1.0) (1.0) (1.3) (1.5)
Amer. Indep. 0.0 0.1 8.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.1
(0.0) (0.0) (0.6) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Green 0.9 4.6 −0.2 −0.7 6.2
(0.8) (2.8) (0.2) (0.3) (0.9)
Libertarian 17.9 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.7 −0.1
(4.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1) (0.1) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2)
Natural Law 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.1 1.0
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6)
Peace & Frdm 3.2 8.2 11.5 9.8 0.1 8.2 5.4 0.2
(0.7) (0.8) (3.3) (2.0) (0.2) (3.3) (1.1) (0.2)
Reform 5.2 5.8 0.5 0.5 0.6
(3.3) (1.6) (0.2) (0.1) (0.1)
Nonpartisan 3.4
(0.8)
Table 4: Average Absolute Gain due to Being Listed in First Position on Ballots using All Races
from 1978 to 2002. Standard errors are in parentheses. As in Table 3, all candidate-speciﬁc eﬀects
are averaged over diﬀerent elections to obtain the overall average eﬀect for each oﬃce and party.
In general elections, no discernible patterns emerge with respect to the prominence of the oﬃce, or
to the order in which the oﬃce appears on the ballot. In primary elections, ballot order eﬀects are
sometimes larger for major oﬃces. In both cases, nonpartisan candidates for the Superintendent
of Education are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by ballot order.
19General Elections
Party President
Senate
Governor
Lt.
Gov.
Atty Genl
Controller
Ins.
Comm.
Sec.
State
Treasurer
Supt Educ
Democrat 2.7 1.5 0.3 −2.2 −1.3 −3.4 0.4 −6.2 0.9
(2.1) (1.4) (2.0) (5.6) (2.7) (3.6) (3.1) (5.8) (3.2)
Republican −2.3 −1.6 3.5 6.7 −1.8 −14.5 3.1 6.4 −5.2
(2.8) (2.2) (2.7) (7.5) (4.2) (5.9) (5.1) (7.3) (6.0)
Amer. Indep. 55.8 12.9 11.9 9.3 11.8 10.3 6.7 29.8 19.1
(5.5) (2.2) (2.4) (7.3) (3.2) (5.0) (2.1) (4.2) (2.7)
Green 10.4 37.9 26.7 29.0 21.8 −8.3 4.7 38.6 10.5
(17.0) (19.2) (14.5) (19.1) (10.7) (6.7) (9.4) (22.3) (6.9)
Libertarian 9.8 9.4 29.1 11.1 16.4 −0.2 17.6 20.7 8.1
(3.1) (1.7) (2.5) (4.7) (2.0) (6.6) (3.2) (2.5) (4.0)
Natural Law 45.3 10.4 27.7 5.7 25.2 25.2 36.1 23.2
(9.7) (3.4) (4.4) (5.7) (7.3) (11.0) (4.9) (11.1)
Peace & Frdm 46.1 18.1 18.1 74.2 4.0 30.7 13.6 49.4 2.3
(7.8) (2.7) (3.3) (12.6) (5.2) (9.1) (11.2) (19.7) (6.0)
Reform 4.8 14.1 28.7 10.4 35.2
(5.7) (4.4) (4.5) (4.2) (4.9)
Nonpartisan 12.0 1.0 8.5
(7.1) (7.4) (1.1)
Primary Elections
Party President
Senate
Governor
Lt.
Gov.
Atty Genl
Controller
Ins.
Comm.
Sec.
State
Treasurer
Supt Educ
Democrat 98.1 31.0 62.9 30.0 28.1 7.5 12.2 23.0 35.6
(49.4) (9.5) (11.0) (17.5) (9.4) (1.7) (4.6) (6.9) (7.2)
Republican 22.5 52.0 33.8 27.1 11.2 14.1 8.9 9.4 5.7
(17.5) (15.0) (7.2) (11.5) (3.7) (3.8) (2.5) (3.4) (3.2)
Amer. Indep. 14.2 30.0 29.0 54.0 28.7 13.8 1.5 48.6 13.1
(25.4) (9.1) (5.0) (17.6) (8.0) (10.3) (6.6) (6.0) (7.2)
Green 12.9 7.9 −15.9 −24.0 22.4
(4.2) (6.9) (14.6) (12.7) (3.1)
Libertarian 166.2 34.1 31.6 12.8 25.1 10.2 9.5 20.6 −2.1
(37.4) (6.6) (14.7) (16.1) (7.1) (5.3) (12.6) (4.8) (8.3)
Natural Law 75.8 51.0 53.5 5.2 24.4 52.4 44.9
(19.3) (7.6) (19.1) (5.4) (7.9) (9.9) (27.3)
Peace & Frdm 6.4 19.6 25.0 19.8 10.1 16.8 11.2 10.9
(2.2) (1.9) (6.9) (4.1) (14.9) (7.3) (2.3) (9.7)
Reform 63.2 24.3 62.3 33.5 48.5
(20.1) (5.4) (28.3) (6.2) (9.5)
Nonpartisan 19.4
(4.0)
Table 5: Average Relative Gain due to Being Listed in First Position on Ballots using All Races
from 1978 to 2002. Standard errors are in parentheses. As in Table 3, all candidate-speciﬁc eﬀects
are averaged over diﬀerent elections to obtain the overall average eﬀect for each oﬃce and party.
In general elections, no discernible patterns emerge with respect to the prominence of the oﬃce, or
to the order in which the oﬃce appears on the ballot. In primary elections, ballot order eﬀects are
sometimes larger for major oﬃces. In both cases, nonpartisan candidates for the Superintendent
of Education are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by ballot order.
20The only exception is the Superintendent of Education, which is a nonpartisan race.
Appendix C presents a host of other conditional eﬀects and yields further insight into various
behavioral models of ballot order eﬀects. First, one might expect ballot order eﬀects to be smaller
in non-incumbent races, since incumbency may act as an informational cue to voters. Incumbents
are denoted on California ballots, which provide current employment descriptions for all candidates.
While we ﬁnd few diﬀerences for incumbent and open races in general elections, in primaries open
seat races appear to be associated with larger ballot order eﬀects (see Table 9). Second, we test
the degree to which ballot order eﬀects are driven by small uninformed groups of voters who turn
out only for the prominent races. We do this by examining on-year versus oﬀ-year (or midterm)
elections. Since contested oﬃces diﬀer in on-year and oﬀ-year elections with the exception of US
Senate elections, we examine Senate results. The ﬁnding shows that the ballot order eﬀect for
on-year elections is generally larger (see Table 10). In particular, Democratic candidates in on-year
general elections gain roughly two percentage points when listed ﬁrst, while exhibiting no gains at
all in oﬀ-year elections.
Lastly, we investigate the magnitude of ballot order eﬀects conditional on the number of can-
didates. This addresses two competing behavioral models of ballot order eﬀects, one positing that
evaluating each additional candidate entails some cognitive cost, and the other positing that the
ﬁrst positions solves a coordination problem between voters (e.g., Forsythe et al., 1993; Mebane,
2000). The cognitive cost model implies monotonically increasing ballot eﬀects in the number
of candidates, while the latter provides a unclear prediction when the number of candidates is
greater than two. We ﬁnd that ballot order eﬀects roughly increase monotonically in the number
of candidates, lending credence to the cognitive cost model (see Table 11).
4.4 Margin of Victory and Ballot Order Eﬀect
To get a sense of the substantive size of these estimated eﬀects, Figure 3 plots the estimated ballot
order eﬀect of the second-highest vote-getter of each race against the margin of victory. The margin
of victory is deﬁned as the diﬀerence in vote shares between the winner and the second-highest
vote-getter in a race.18 Thick conﬁdence intervals indicate that they include or exceed the margin
of victory. The ﬁgure underscores the fact that the substantive eﬀect of ballot order on election
outcomes hinges largely on how close the races are. In general elections, as suggested by our
previous results, we ﬁnd no conclusive evidence of ballot order eﬀects on major candidates. In
18Note that for primaries, we deﬁne a race here as a competition for the nomination for the party nomination.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Estimated Average Ballot Order Eﬀect for Second-highest Vote-getter
and Margins of Victory from 1978 to 2002. The top panel shows general elections, and the bottom
panel represents the primary elections. Circles indicate the point estimate for the (absolute) average
ballot order eﬀect whereas vertical bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals. The 45˚ lines represent
the instances where the ballot order eﬀect equals the margin of victory. Thicker intervals indicate
the races where the margin of victory is included in or below the 95% conﬁdence interval. The
ﬁgure implies that the outcomes of four primaries might have been diﬀerent if the candidates were
listed diﬀerently on ballots. 22contrast, ballot order eﬀects were signiﬁcantly positive and possibly greater than the margin of
victory in 7 of 59 primary races. This indicates, for example, that ballot order might potentially
have changed the winner of the Democratic primary for the oﬃce of Secretary of State or the
Republican primary for the oﬃce of Treasurer in 2002 if ballot order were determined diﬀerently.
5 Policy Implications for Ballot Reform
If one of the primary goals of election law is to provide equal opportunity to candidates, our ﬁndings
suggest that election oﬃcials may want to randomize the name order of candidates on ballots and
minimize ballot order eﬀects. In short, unlike some prescriptions drawn from behavioral studies,
ours demonstrates a clear solution to remove bias in social choice (Jolls and Sunstein, 2004). In
this section, we ﬁrst outline the costs and beneﬁts of randomization. Second, we conduct a cost-
eﬀectiveness analysis and show that randomization of ballot order is more cost-eﬀective at reducing
election day bias than currently proposed voting reforms by more than a factor of 100. The basic
intuition is that since randomization requires no substantial ﬁnancing of new voting equipment, it
is by far the most cost-eﬀective way to reduce voting bias. Lastly, we examine the range of statutes
governing ballot order across the ﬁfty states to suggest potential avenues of reform. Surveying
ballot statutes in all the ﬁfty states reveals that these rules are typically employed to advantage
major parties in what we may describe as an anti-competitive partisan lockup (Issacharoﬀ and
Pildes, 1998).
5.1 Cost and Beneﬁts of Randomization
The primary beneﬁt of randomization lies in improving the fairness of elections.19 Randomization
would improve the fairness of elections for major and minor parties alike. Our study shows that
non-random ballot order disproportionately beneﬁts one candidate in virtually all primaries. While
in general elections randomization is unlikely to change outcomes, in twelve percent of primary races
examined, ballot order might have changed the winner of the race. Randomization would therefore
help all parties, including the Democratic and Republican parties, nominate the most preferred
candidates for the general election.
19Without purporting to answer larger and vitally important philosophical questions of fairness, we concur that
“[u]nder any reasonable standard of fairness, ballot format should not determine the outcome of an election.”
Jonathan N. Wand, Michael C. Herron and Henry E. Brady, “Ballot Cost Gore Thousands of Votes,” San Diego
Union-Tribune, Nov. 19, 2000, at G-3.
23That said, various randomization methods diﬀer in the eﬀectiveness of reducing ballot order
eﬀects. Statistical theory clearly predicts that the bias of ballot order eﬀects will decrease in the
number of units across which the ballot is randomized. To truly reduce ballot order eﬀects to zero,
states may want to conduct randomization across smaller units, such as counties or precincts. In
the future, the advancement of electronic voting technology might even allow the name order of
candidates to be randomized separately for each individual voter. On the other hand, in practice,
randomizing across every precinct, or every voter, may not be feasible. We therefore suggest
principal cost criteria by which states might decide how to implement cost-eﬀective randomization.
The costs of randomization are fourfold. First, election oﬃcials may incur the administrative
costs in conducting a randomized drawing of the ballot order. This includes concerns over added
complexity of randomization and the risk of mistakes in electoral administration. With the aid of
modern computer technology, however, the cost of drawing a random alphabet itself is minor. To
make this process transparent, administrative costs may additionally entail publicizing the event,
as in California (see Section 3.1). Second, election oﬃcials may incur marginal printing costs for
randomized ballots. This presents a tradeoﬀ: as the number of randomizations increases, ballot
order eﬀects decrease but printing costs increase. On the other hand, precincts and counties already
print out speciﬁc versions of ballots due to local oﬃces and issues. California, for example, currently
prints roughly 18,000 styles of ballots for a general election and over 25,000 styles for primaries.20
As a result, the marginal printing costs of randomization are relatively small. In fact, as we show
in Section 5.2, these printing costs are miniscule compared to all existing voting reform eﬀorts.
The third cost is in voter confusion. Some argue that alphabetical or partisan ballots permit
voters to locate their preferred candidate more eﬃciently than randomized ballots. Randomiza-
tion might also disproportionately harm some parties over others. Candidates, for example, could
no longer campaign on speciﬁc ballot positions (e.g., “Vote No. 3 on the Ballot”) and voting a
straight party tickets may be more diﬃcult. Yet we ﬁnd that the magnitude of ballot order eﬀects
for Democratic and Republican candidates in primaries is substantially the same, providing lit-
tle evidence for disproportionate eﬀects among the major parties. Rather than listing candidates
in some deﬁned order to ease locating of candidates, oﬃcials may explore alternatives to make
the identiﬁcation of candidates easier. As the California Supreme Court suggested, listing incum-
bent status and candidate parties, for example, allows voters to identify candidates even when
randomizing the ballot order.
20We thank Melissa Warren and Joanna Southard at the Elections Division, Secretary of State, for this insight.
24Lastly, randomization may entail costs in governmental stability. This is premised on the argu-
ment that a government objective of promoting stability may reasonably justify listing majoritarian
parties and incumbents ﬁrst. This rationale is most directly at odds with the fairness beneﬁt of
randomization. Further, the argument for partisan orders does not apply directly to primaries,
where major parties are often nominating candidates within their own party. And the argument
for incumbency was explicitly refuted by the California Supreme Court, which “emphatically re-
ject[ed] the notion that the government may consciously choose to favor the election of incumbents
over non-incumbents ...distort[ing] the preferences of participating voters” (Gould v. Grubb, at
673). Based on the above tradeoﬀs, states will have to decide whether to adopt and how to im-
plement randomization. Next, we show that current reform eﬀorts that focus largely on voting
equipment appear inconsistent with a principle of cost-eﬀective reduction of voting bias.
5.2 The Cost-Eﬀectiveness of Randomization
A primary goal of voting reform is to reduce voting bias due to arbitrary factors such as voting
machines and ballot formats. Following the 2000 presidential election, the most signiﬁcant reform
eﬀort has focused on updating old voting equipment to optical scan or electronic voting machines
in order to reduce the number of undervotes. In this section, we assess the cost-eﬀectiveness of
randomizing the ballot order relative to various reforms by calculating the cost of reducing voting
bias per vote. Cost-eﬀectiveness analysis “is designed to compare a set of regulatory actions with
the same primary outcome” (US Oﬃce of Management and Budget, 2003, p.128) (here, one biased
vote), to assess the eﬃciency of policy options. Accordingly, we estimate the dollar amount required
for each reform measure to reduce voting bias by one vote.21
Table 6 presents such estimated costs (per biased vote) of extant ballot reforms and com-
pares them with the cost of randomization. Although existing estimated costs of voting reform
and randomization are somewhat rough, the table illustrates the relative cost-eﬀectiveness of ran-
domization. We take 2.03% as the estimate of the ballot order eﬀect, which is the average of
point estimates for Democratic and Republican candidates in primary elections. For the estimated
marginal cost of randomization, we relied on a series of interviews and ﬁgures reported in the press.
While on several occasions, it was asserted to us that the costs are eﬀectively zero, here we use the
21Note, of course, that this is inherently diﬀerent than comparing the total costs or the cost per voter of reform
measures. Only looking at such costs ignores the beneﬁt side of reform, thereby failing to assess cost-eﬀectiveness
entirely.
25Source of Magnitude (%) Proposed Reform Dollar Amount Spent to
Voting Bias Eliminate One Biased Vote
Ballot Order 2.03 Randomized Rotation
by Assembly District 0.19 − 0.38a
by City and Town 7.30b
Voting Equipmentc
Lever Machines 1.88 Replacement with
Optical Scans 105.89
Electronic Voting Machines 473.56
Paper Ballots 1.89 Replacement with
Optical Scans 103.91
Electronic Voting Machines 456.90
Punch Cards 2.67 Replacement with
Optical Scans 44.37
Electronic Voting Machines 129.47
Table 6: Cost Eﬀectiveness of Selected Ballot Reforms. The magnitude of potential bias for ballot order
represents the estimated ballot order eﬀect from our analysis of California primary elections. For voting
equipment, the ﬁgures are based on the estimated undervote rate obtained from the United States General
Accounting Oﬃce. The estimated cost per ballot represents dollar amount one needs to spend in order to
reduce bias by one ballot.
aThe ﬁgure is based on California’s primary system on the estimated cost obtained through the authors’ interview with an
election oﬃcial of Sonoma County Registar of Voters for the 2004 Presidential Primary.
bThe ﬁgure is based on New Hampshire’s primary system and the estimated cost given by the Secretary of State Oﬃce for
the 2004 Presidential Primary. See Dan Tuohy, “Alphabetical Ballot Puts Dean at Top,” Eagle Tribune, Feb. 12, 2003.
cThe magnitude of bias is based on the estimated undervote rate reported by US General Accounting Oﬃce (2001). The
undervote rates for optical scans and electronic voting machines are 1.32 and 1.59%, respectively. For example, switching from
punch cards to optical scan would reduce the undervote rate by about 1.35 percentage points. The cost calculation is based
on the estimates reported by Caltech and MIT Voting Technology Project (2001, p.52). For example, the report estimated
the costs of updating the old equipments to optical scan and electronic voting machine to be $0.60 and $1.40, respectively for
every voter. Hence, the marginal costs of reducing one biased vote with optical scans, for example, equals 0.60/0.0135. Cost
ﬁgures are marginal cost estimates, assuming equipment acquisition costs are borne over the equipment’s lifespan.
marginal cost of printing diﬀerent ballots to provide conservative estimates. Speciﬁcally, we use
an estimated cost of randomizing across Assembly Districts that is given by a California County
Registrar of Voters as well as the estimated marginal cost of randomization across cities and towns
that is given by New Hampshire Secretary of State Oﬃce.22 To obtain the dollar amount necessary
to reduce voting bias by one vote, we divide the marginal costs over the estimated number of voters
who voted for the ﬁrst candidate solely due to ballot order.
We estimate that California spends roughly 20 to 40 cents to eliminate a biased vote due to ballot
order.23 When the units of randomization are small, the cost is higher: New Hampshire will spend
22Both ﬁgures are for 2004 primary election. New Hampshire’s estimate stems from 2003 state law that repudiated
randomized rotation.
23Note that “elimination” here should be interpreted as uniformly distributing votes that are determined by ballot
26about $7 to eliminate one biased vote if they decide to randomize ballot order by town and cities.
The second column of Table 6 gives the estimates of undervote rate for diﬀerent voting machines in
use, which are based on the report by US General Accounting Oﬃce (2001, Table 1). Again, as in
the calculation of the cost-eﬀectiveness of randomization, we use these ﬁgures to calculate the dollar
amount spent to eliminate one biased vote, where a biased vote is deﬁned for voting equipment
as a vote that remains uncounted solely due to voting equipment. For example, switching from
punch cards to optical scan would reduce the undervote rate by about 1.35 percentage points.
Given the cost of obtaining new equipment amortized over the equipment lifetime, this amounts
to approximately $44 for optical scans and $130 for electronic voting machines.
Table 6 clearly demonstrates the relative cost-eﬀectiveness in reducing voting bias of random-
ization. While states may spend anywhere from $40 to $470 to reduce the bias of one hanging chad,
less than a dollar could be invested to reduce the bias of ballot order by randomizing across units
that are size of California Assembly Districts. Although our estimates do not account for other
dimensions of beneﬁts and costs of reforms and are based only on rough estimates, the basic rea-
son for the relative cost-eﬀectives of randomization is transparent: equipment reform entails large
acquisition costs of expensive machines, whereas randomization does not. Our analysis strongly
suggests that the focus of current reform eﬀorts can be altered to achieve more cost-eﬀective voting
reform.
5.3 Existing Policies and Possible Reforms
Depending on how states choose to address the tradeoﬀ in costs and beneﬁts of randomization,
many potential areas and intermediate steps for reform may exist. Table 7 summarizes ballot
order statutes for gubernatorial general elections in all the ﬁfty states, from statutory research and
interviews with election oﬃcials.24 We classify these statutes by the primary determinant of the
order across all candidates.
24 The sources are as follows. Ala. Code § 17-8-4 (2003); Interview with Vicki Balogh, Director of Elections, Oﬃce
of Secretary of State, Alabama, Aug. 19, 2003; Alaska Stat. § 15.15.030 (2003); Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 16-502 (2003);
Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-208 (2003); Cal. Elec. Code§ 13112 (2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-5-404 (2002); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 9-249a (2003); Del. Code Ann. tit. 15 § 4502 (2003); Fla. Stat. § 101.151 (2002) Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-285
(2002); Haw. Rev. Stat§ 11-115 (2003); Idaho Code § 34-903 (2003); 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7-12 (2003); Ind. Code
Ann. § 3-11-2-6 (2003); Iowa Code § 49.31 (2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 25-610 (2002); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 118.225
& 118.215 (2002); Interview with Patsy Casey, Executive Staﬀ Adviser for Election Division, Kentucky, Aug. 20,
2003; La. Admi. Code tit. 18 § 551 (2003); Code Me. R. tit. 21 § 601 (2003); Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 9-210
(2002); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54§ 41A (2003); Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.703 (2003); Interview with Brad Wittman,
Director of Information Services, Secretary of State, Michigan, Aug. 19, 2003; Minn. Stat. § 204D.13 (2002); Miss.
Code Ann. § 23-15-367 (2003); Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 9, § 115.239 (2003); Mont. Code Ann. § 13-12-205 (2002);
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 32-814 (2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293.267 (2003); N.H. Code Admin. R. Ann. § 656:5
(2002); N.J. Admin. Code tit. 19§ 19:14-12 (2003); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1-10-8.1 (2003); N.Y. Elec.§ 7-116 (McKinney
27Type Speciﬁc Rule Adopting states
Partisan Incumbent ﬁrst, then alphabetical MA
Partisan vote share, then alphabetical AZ, CT, GA, MI, MNa, NH, NC, PA
Partisan vote share, then order of certiﬁcation FL, IN, MO
Partisan vote share, then discretionary NY, WI
Partisan vote share, then randomized WY, KY, RI
Main parties ﬁrst, then alphabetical DE, MD, TN, UT, VAb
Main parties ﬁrst, then rotational NE
Main parties ﬁrst, then randomized TX
Partisan rotational OK, SC
Discretionary IDc, MSd
Alphabetical Alphabetical only ALe, CO, HI, LA, ME, NV, VT
Alphabetical rotational OH, IA, KS, MT
Randomized Randomized non-rotational AK, AR, NJf, NM, OR, SD, WA, WV
Randomized rotational CA, NDg
Other Order of ﬁling, ties resolved randomly IL
Table 7: Types of Ballot Order Rules for State Gubernatorial Races in General Elections as of 2003.
Only two states, California and North Dakota, randomize the ballot order and have some variation across
electoral districts. In all the other states, the ballot order is likely to favor certain candidates.
aCandidates with lowest partisan vote share listed ﬁrst
bParties randomized
cSecretary of State
dOﬃcer charged with printing ballot
eParties alphabetized ﬁrst, then independents alphabetical
fRandomized by party within county
gRandomized separately in each of 53 counties, and then rotated through precinct ordered by total votes cast for governor
in the last election
ballot order, namely partisan, alphabetical, and randomized types.
Twenty-eight states adopt partisan rules that may introduce the largest bias due to ballot order.
Partisan rules hold that incumbents, major party candidates, or candidates with the largest vote
shares in previous elections be listed ﬁrst.25 Connecticut is representative of these states, providing
that the “names of the parties shall be arranged” by the order of “[t]he party whose candidate for
Governor polled the highest number of votes in the last–preceding election” (Conn. Gen. Stat.
2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-165.6 (2003); N.D. Cent. Code, § 16.1-11-27 & 16.1-06-05 (2003); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3505.03 (Anderson 2003); Okla. Stat. tit. 26 § 6-106 (2002); Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.155 (2001); 25 Pa. Stat.
Ann. § 3010 (2003); R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-19-9.1 (2002); Interview with Mike Narducci, Clerk, Elections Division,
Secretary of State, Rhode Island, Aug. 19, 2003; S.C. Code Ann. § 7-13-330 & 7-13-335 (2002); Interview with Liz
Simmons, Technician, Elections Commission, South Carolina, Aug. 19, 2003; S.D. Codiﬁed Laws § 12-16-3.1 (2003);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-5-206 (2003); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 52.094 (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 20A-6-301 (2003); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 17 § 2472 (2003); Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-613 (Michie 2003); Wash. Rev. Code § 29.30.025 (2003);
W. Va. Code § 3-5-13a (2003); Wis. Stat. § 5.64 (2002); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-6-121 (2003).
25We also include discretionary statutes of Idaho and Mississippi that allow the Secretary of State to determine
the ballot order in this category, since it vests power in incumbents to determine the order. Other states that are
classiﬁed as alphabetical types, such as Alabama, also alphabetize party names ﬁrst, so the typology distinguishing
between primarily partisan and alphabetical types may not be entirely clearcut.
289-249a(1), 2003). While substantial variation in the speciﬁc implementation exists, particularly in
how independents are listed, in all of these jurisdictions incumbents and majoritarian candidates
beneﬁt from ballot order eﬀects. Ballot statutes in these states are most easily characterized as
anti-competitive in nature.
Some 11 states follow alphabetical rules, diﬀering primarily in whether the alphabetical order
is uniform across the state or rotated across some sub-state unit.26 Naturally, uniform alphabetical
orders favor candidates with surnames earlier in the alphabet. Alphabetical order may, for example,
disproportionately aﬀect particular ethnic groups that have names clustered in the Roman alphabet,
such as Chinese names like Zhang, Wang, or Yi. Nonetheless, alphabetical rotation may provide
one solution to states. It enables voters to easily locate candidates on ballots, while roughly
ensuring that all candidates are listed ﬁrst an equal number of times. Of course, even then the
problem remains that the relative position of candidates stays the same for most districts (and
across elections), thereby still potentially favoring one candidate.
Roughly 10 states already employ some form of randomization to determine the ballot order.
While this substantially reduces bias across elections, the majority of these states, after one ran-
domization, maintain the same ballot order in any particular election. Hence, for each election,
the candidate randomly selected to be listed ﬁrst still reaps substantial beneﬁts of ballot order.
To reduce bias further, states may want to consider randomizations across smaller units, such as
counties or precincts, and/or randomization of candidates, rather than the alphabet.
Only two states, California and North Dakota, employ randomization with diﬀerent ballot
orders across subunits of the states for general elections, thereby providing the smallest bias due to
the ballot order eﬀect among existing election practices. Nonetheless, even in these two states, there
is room for improvement in reducing ballot eﬀects. Just like the alphabetical rotational scheme,
California’s rotational rule may produce a relative advantage of one candidate over another in any
given race.27 Randomization across many subunits without rotation therefore might further reduce
bias resulting from ballot order.
In sum, if states choose to minimize ballot bias, they have much potential to improve. The vast
majority of states employ rules that systematically favor a two-party duopoly. The good news is
26Ohio, for example, prints ballots in alphabetical order in the ﬁrst precinct and for “each succeeding precinct, the
name in each group that is listed ﬁrst in the preceding precinct shall be listed last, and the name of each candidate
shall be moved up one place” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 3505.03 (Anderson 2003).
27Even in North Dakota, where randomization is conducted separately within each of the 53 counties, the precincts
across which ballots are rotated are arranged in the order of total votes cast for governor in the last election.
29that even small steps towards complete randomization, such as rotation or one-shot randomization,
are likely to drastically reduce ballot order eﬀects, at a cost that appears to be substantially lower
and more eﬀective than many other areas of ballot reform.
6 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis of the California alphabet lottery from 1978 to 2002 provides one detailed case study
of the eﬀects of partisan control of electoral regulation. In the majority of states, legislatures
appear to have exploited voter biases to entrench status quo candidates. This case study suggests
a clear prescriptive and cost-eﬀective solution to reduce the eﬀects of voter cognitive bias and
improve fairness in elections. We also place the study of ballot order eﬀects on solid empirical
ground, avoiding the external validity problems of laboratory experiments and the potential biases
of observational studies. The results of this study are largely consistent with theories emphasizing
the importance of informational cues. We detect the largest ballot eﬀects, when voters lack partisan
labels on ballots, as in nonpartisan races, or when those labels cannot distinguish between multiple
candidates, as in primary races.
Appendix
A Identiﬁcation of Variance
The population variance of the estimated average ballot order eﬀect ˆ τ in equation 2 is the sum of
the variances for the two potential outcomes, i.e., V (ˆ τ) = V {b Y (t0)}+V {b Y (t)}.28 Using the result
from the systematic sampling literature (e.g., Madow and Madow, 1944), for s = t,t0 with t 6= t0
each of the two variances is
V {b Y (s)} =
σ2
s(K − 1)
nsK
{1 + (ns − 1)ρs}, (3)
where σ2
s is the population variance of Yk(s). ρs is the intraclass correlation coeﬃcient between
pairs of potential outcomes within the same systematic sample and is given by
ρs =
2
(ns − 1)(K − 1)σ2
s
J X
l=1
X
m<m0
{Y ∗
lm(s) − Y (s)}{Y ∗
lm0(s) − Y (s)}, (4)
28Here we consider the population to consist of all potential outcomes for each candidate.
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Figure 4: Simple Random and Systematic Random Assignment under the Populations with Mono-
tonic and Periodic Trends. The ﬁgure shows how the order of the population aﬀects variance
estimation under the a given assignment mechanism.
where Y ∗
lm(s) denotes the potential vote share in the mth district in the lth systematic sample
(for the candidate and under the sth ballot position). ρs represents a measure of the homogene-
ity of each potential outcome within a sample averaging over the J possible treatment assignment
combinations. Unfortunately, V (ˆ τ) cannot be consistently estimated without making some assump-
tions about the population since we only observe one systematic random sample of the treatment
assignment combination.
Nevertheless, the expression of V (ˆ τ) from equation 3 has a useful interpretation. If ρs = 0, the
variance is the same as that for simple random assignment. When ρs < 0, we have a heterogeneous
sample that is more representative of the population and the variance is lower than that of simple
random assignment. For example, suppose that Yk(s) is monotonically increasing in k as in the left
panel in Figure 4. Systematic random assignment ensures that we obtain units across the whole
range of k, whereas simple random assignment does not. In the ﬁgure, the circles representing
simple random assignment are centered toward the lower end of the vote share, whereas systematic
random assignment is evenly distributed across the assembly districts. On the other hand, when
ρs > 0, we have a homogeneous sample, and thereby the variance of the estimator is greater than
that of simple random assignment. The most pathological case is one of periodicity that coincides
with J, as shown in the right panel of Figure 4. In that case, simple random assignment is more
31eﬃcient, since it ensures sampling units that are along any part of the wave-like pattern of the
population. Systematic random assignment, however, samples only those assembly districts with
low vote shares, since the periodicity coincides almost exactly with J.
Given this nature of systematic random assignment, we estimate the variance based on diﬀerent
assumptions about the population. In particular, we consider the following four types of variance
estimators for V {b Y (s)} developed in the literature (e.g., Wolter, 1984). They are based on the
population models with random order, linear trend, stratiﬁcation, and autocorrelation.
b Vrand = (1 − f)
P
k∈{k:Tk=s}{Yk(s) − b Y (s)}2
ns(ns − 1)
, (5)
b Vline = (1 − f)
P
k∈{k:Tk=s}{Yk(s) − 2Yk−1(s) + Yk−2(s)}2
6ns(ns − 2)
, (6)
b Vstra = (1 − f)
P
k∈{k:Tk=s}{Yk(s) − Yk−1(s)}2
2ns(ns − 1)
, (7)
b Vauto =



b Vrand [1 + 2/log ˆ ps + 2ˆ ps/(1 − ˆ ps)] if ˆ ps > 0,
b Vrand if ˆ ps ≤ 0,
(8)
where f = ns/K is the ﬁnite population correction and ˆ ps =
P
k∈{k:Tk=s}{Yk(s)− b Y (s)}{Yk−1(s)−
b Y (s)}/
Pns
k∈{k:Tk=s}{Yk(s) − b Y (s)}2. A few remarks about each estimator are worthwhile. First,
b Vrand assumes that assembly districts are randomly ordered. While b Vline is designed to eliminate
a linear trend by taking successive diﬀerences, b Vstrat assumes that the mean of the potential vote
shares is constant within each stratum of J districts. Finally, b Vauto is based on the autocorrelated
population model where the correlation of two potential vote shares depends only on the diﬀerence
in their assembly district number.
Given that we do not know which of these candidate estimators best approximates the true
variance of the potential vote shares, we employ an auxiliary variable approach advocated in the
systematic sampling literature to select the estimator. Since party registration is known to be
one of the best predictors for a candidate’s actual vote share in an election, it provides an ideal
auxiliary variable. We evaluate the performance of the four estimators using party registration
data for each election.29 For any party and number of candidates running in a particular race, we
can then calculate how the estimators perform across all possible systematic samples compared to
known true variance of party registration.30
29If oﬃcial registration data was unavailable for a particular election, we used registration data from the closest
election.
30For closed primary races, this approach may not be appropriate since party registrants are the only eligible
voters. Thus, we conducted sensitivity analyses using both the random list and minimum MSE estimators.
32Given this auxiliary variable, we select the variance estimator that performed best in terms
of mean squared error (MSE) criteria to estimate the variance of ballot order eﬀects. For the
1998 and 2000 general elections, for example, among 66 candidates considered, 47% of the time
the minimum MSE is the random list estimator and 33% of the time it is the autocorrelation
estimator. The median variance bias among the selected estimators is 0.4%, and the variance bias
ranges from −25% (5 percentile) to 35% (95 percentile). Interestingly, assuming a random list is
generally conservative for California, since the intra-class correlation coeﬃcient for all parties is
negative at observed J. This is consistent with the registration patterns across Assembly Districts
in California as seen in Figure 1, with more liberal urban districts clustered in the North and in
Los Angeles, but generally more conservative districts in the South.
B Assessing Balance of Covariates
While randomization balances covariates in expectation across repeated experiments, in any given
sample covariates might still remain imbalanced. In particular, systematic treatment assignment
is susceptible to trends such as periodicity in the population, since randomization occurs only once
per race. As a result, checking the balance of Assembly Districts in any one particular race remains
a crucial test for the validity of inferences. Table 8 reports simple means tests for the covariates,
taken from 1990 Census and registration data, that are widely known to be good predictors for
voting behavior. In particular, we calculate mean diﬀerences and their t-statistics between districts
in which Gray Davis was listed ﬁrst in the 1998 gubernatorial general election and the remaining
districts. In this case, the covariates appear to be balanced well, with only negligible diﬀerences in
all dimensions.
To check balance of covariates for all potential treatment assignments, we calculate means
tests for 34 covariates from the 1990 Census data and party registration reports j = {3,...,8}
corresponding to the range of observed number of candidates running.31 The covariates include
31The following covariates are taken from the 1990 Census and Voter Registration reports: proportion male,
proportion latino / white / black (others as base), proportion of adult population graduated highschool / have
associate or college degrees (less than high school as base), proportion ages 18-24 / 25-34 / 35-44 / 45-54 / 55-64 / 65
and over (12-17 as base), proportion with household income $0-9,999 / $10,000-19,999 / $20,000-29,999 / $ 30,000-
39,999 / $ 40,000-49,999 / $ 50,000-99,999 / $100,000-149,999 ($150,000 or more as base), proportion of housing
in urban environment, proportion of male / female labor force unemployed, proportion of industry in agriculture /
manufacturing, proportion of population in poverty status, and proportion of voters registered with the Democratic /
Republican / American Independent / Green / Libertarian / Natural Law / Reform parties and proportion registered
33Treated Control T-stat
Registered Democratic 0.45 0.47 0.75
Proportion Male 0.53 0.54 1.30
Proportion Black 0.16 0.16 0.05
Proportion Latino 0.05 0.09 1.71
High school graduate 0.75 0.74 −0.13
Age (≥45 years) 0.28 0.28 −0.24
Income (≥ $40,000) 0.54 0.56 0.53
Poverty level 0.11 0.13 0.57
Urban Housing 0.91 0.93 0.33
Table 8: Means Tests of Selected Covariates. The table compares the 11 districts in which Gray
Davis was listed ﬁrst (Treated) with the remaining districts (Control) in the 1998 gubernatorial
election. The covariates are selected from the 1990 Census data.
major potential confounding variables such as gender, race, education, income, urbanization, unem-
ployment, industry, poverty levels, and party registration for the major seven parties recognized in
California. Since for each j, there are j possible treatment assignments, this yields 1,122 = 34×
P
j
means tests. Figure 5 compares these t-statistics with the quantiles of the t-distribution with ap-
propriate degrees of freedom. Under simple random assignment, we expect the distribution of the
test statistics to approximate a t-distribution. The statistics are overwhelmingly bounded by the
shaded 95% intervals, indicating that there is relative balance across all observed treatment as-
signments. In fact, in the case of small number of candidates, the covariate balance appears to be
even better than under simple random assignment. As the number of candidates increases, balance
decreases, as indicated by the few outliers for the 8 candidate panel, although the distribution still
generally follows a t-distribution. All together, the analysis of this section shows no evidence of
incomplete randomization.
C Conditional Eﬀects
with other parties or declining to state registration.
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Figure 5: Distribution of T-statistics from Covariate Means Tests. The t-statistics are calculated
using every systematic treatment assignment combination for 34 district level covariates. The
statistics are plotted against the quantiles of a t-distribution with a corresponding degrees of
freedom. The solid lines represent 45% degree line, and the gray bar indicates the area where
p-values are less than 0.95.
General Election Primary Election
Incumbent Open Incumbent Open
Race Race Race Race
Party ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE
Democratic 0.27 0.59 -0.30 0.73 1.79 0.32 1.92 0.22
Republican -0.66 0.64 0.91 0.90 3.78 0.65 1.74 0.27
American Independent 0.15 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.26 0.05 3.81 0.18
Green 0.83 0.28 0.24 0.20 3.34 3.96 3.10 0.38
Libertarian 0.24 0.02 0.21 0.03 0.43 0.08 10.01 1.05
Natural Law 0.18 0.03 0.51 0.15 0.41 0.06 0.38 0.20
Peace and Freedom 0.23 0.04 0.39 0.04 4.57 0.86 6.86 0.43
Reform 0.31 0.10 0.15 0.03 3.73 0.69 4.42 1.37
Nonpartisan 1.59 0.39 2.67 0.47 3.08 0.54 3.89 0.65
Table 9: Absolute Ballot Order Eﬀects Conditional Whether Incumbents are Running.
35General Election Primary Election
On-Year Oﬀ-Year On-Year Oﬀ-Year
Party ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE
Democratic 1.94 0.90 -0.84 1.23 0.88 0.29 1.55 0.30
Republican -0.08 1.23 -1.16 1.40 2.81 0.51
American Independent 0.18 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.05
Green 1.50 1.04 0.33 0.05 4.58 2.07
Libertarian 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.02 0.49 0.10
Natural Law 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.19 0.03
Peace and Freedom 0.51 0.07 0.25 0.13 6.06 1.05 1.99 0.55
Reform 0.26 0.07 0.01 0.06 5.83 1.14
Nonpartisan
Table 10: Absolute Ballot Order Eﬀects for on On or Oﬀ-Year Elections for Senate Elections.
General Elections
N
o
.
C
a
n
d
.
Democrat
Republican
Am.
Indep.
Green
Libertarian
Natl Law
Peace & Frdm
Reform
Nonpartisan
ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE
2 8.5 1.1
5 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.4 17.1 1.4 6.7 6.3 11.8 1.4 5.8 12.4 17.7 1.6 10.3 5.4
6 0.1 1.6 −1.8 2.6 18.1 2.2 10.3 4.7 19.3 1.8 20.8 6.3 14.0 6.4 2.8 6.5
7 −1.4 2.2 −0.4 3.2 26.3 3.5 31.3 10.7 13.4 2.0 32.1 3.1 41.6 5.7 20.9 2.3 12.7 13.3
8 3.2 6.3 −13.2 7.8 45.0 15.5 32.8 32.8 31.6 11.9 25.4 9.1 76.7 19.7 9.2 8.0
Primary Elections
N
o
.
C
a
n
d
.
Democrat
Republican
Am.
Indep.
Green
Libertarian
Natl Law
Peace & Frdm
Reform
Nonpartisan
ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE ATE SE
2 11.8 1.0 7.4 0.7 29.5 1.2 18.4 1.9 13.9 1.0
3 14.1 3.2 8.7 1.1
4 12.3 1.7 14.9 1.6 18.9 3.3
5 29.1 2.4 20.8 3.5 19.9 2.5
7 −2.4 4.5 34.3 6.4 13.8 10.3 10.2 5.3 5.2 5.4 10.1 14.9 33.5 6.2
8 5.4 4.1 10.6 6.3 25.1 4.5 15.0 6.7 38.4 6.3 14.0 3.0 48.5 9.5
9 35.6 4.5 3.0 4.6 13.1 7.2 −2.1 8.3 44.9 27.3 10.9 9.7
10 36.7 7.8 11.2 2.6 28.7 8.0 25.1 7.1 19.8 2.9
11 63.7 5.7
13 60.3 5.5 52.3 5.9 36.0 11.0 −24.0 12.7 18.4 8.2 26.6 6.2 15.5 5.1 43.0 15.1
15 11.0 12.5 68.4 9.5 42.1 12.3 1.4 10.7 44.0 12.7 75.5 13.8 24.5 4.9
17 73.2 19.0 65.1 11.3 28.0 14.7 −15.9 14.6 31.6 14.7 53.5 19.1 19.1 3.4
23 98.1 44.4 22.5 10.1 14.2 25.4 12.9 3.7 166.2 19.1 75.8 19.3 63.2 9.6
Table 11: Relative Ballot Order Eﬀects Conditional on the Number of Candidates
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